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Abstract This paper deals with possible foreign reactions to unilateral carbon de-
mand reducing policies. It differentiates between demand side and supply side reac-
tions as well as between intra- and intertemporal shifts in greenhouse gas emissions.
In our model, we integrate a stock-dependent marginal physical cost of extracting
fossil fuels into Eichner & Pethig’s (2011) general equilibrium carbon leakage model.
The results are as follows: Under similar but somewhat tighter conditions than those
derived by Eichner & Pethig (2011), a weak green paradox arises. Furthermore, a
strong green paradox can arise in our model under supplementary constraints. That
means a “green” policy measure might not only lead to a harmful acceleration of
fossil fuel extraction but to an increase in the cumulative climate damages at the
same time. In some of these cases there is even a cumulative extraction expansion,
which we consider disastrous.
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1 Introduction
There is currently a lively debate in the literature on the relevance and economic sig-
nificance of the so called green paradox, which was initially identified by Sinn (2008).
The concept of this paradox was expanded on significantly by Gerlagh (2011), who dis-
tinguishes between a weak and a strong green paradox. Following him, we consider it
a weak green paradox if the announcement of a “greener” policy leads to an increase of
near-term emissions and consider it a strong green paradox if such policy increases the
net present value of cumulative climate damages.1 The aim of our paper is to discuss
conditions for the emergence of a weak or strong green paradox in a setting we consider
appropriate for the task, i. e. in a general equilibrium world market setting in which
intra- and intertemporal carbon leakage as well as changes in the cumulative emissions
may occur.
In relation to our model, the current literature on intra- and intertemporal carbon
leakage can be grouped along several lines: They either apply partial2 or general3 equi-
librium settings, have multiple countries and thereby allow for intratemporal leakage,4
differ in the number of periods,5 etc.6 Given the focus of this paper, the emphasis is
mainly on those models that differentiate between a weak and a strong form of the green
paradox. As we will see, the interpretation of these terms may differ between the papers.
A broader discussion of the green paradox literature and on the channels through which
it might emerge is carried out by van der Werf & Di Maria (2012).
In Sinn’s (2008) initial contribution he discusses the green paradox basically as a timing
problem. He uses a one country model in continuous time and an infinite time horizon
1See Gerlagh (2011, 82).
2These are among others Fischer & Salant (2012), Fischer & Salant (2013), Harstad (2012), Hoel (2011),
Hoel (2012), Hoel (2013), and Hoel & Jensen (2012).
3This is particularly the case for Eichner & Pethig (2011), Eichner & Pethig (2013), and van der Ploeg
& Withagen (2012).
4Intratemporal or spatial leakage is discussed e. g. in Eichner & Pethig (2011), Eichner & Pethig (2013),
Fischer & Salant (2013), Grafton et al. (2012), and Hoel (2011).
5Discrete or continuous, finite or infinite models.
6Where these groups are of course not exclusive, depending on its properties each model fits one or
more of them.
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to analyze the fossil fuel supply side reactions to several demand reducing policies and
demonstrates that these can have adverse effects, i. e. accelerating instead of postponing
global resource extraction. The phenomenon leads to an shift of the fossil fuel extraction
to the present and thus to higher current greenhouse gas emissions. A precondition for
this green paradox is the existence of a resource rent. As Sinn (2008) puts (reasonable)
bounds on the price elasticity of demand for fossil fuel and the marginal extraction cost,7
there is neither full depletion in finite time nor a break off of supply with stock left in
situ in his model.8 Given this structure, the movements of the extraction path are always
monotonous.9 Therefore, second best situations with intermediate acceleration but a
decrease in long-run cumulative emissions do not occur.
While Sinn (2008) rightfully emphasizes the usual absence of supply side considerations
in environmental policy analyses, he was of course not the first to do so. What can be
considered a special case or application of the green paradox was already highlighted
by Sinclair (1992). He finds that under perfect competition, with the global warming
externality and costless extraction, carbon taxes should be steadily falling. The author
states that the level of taxation is irrelevant and that an over time increasing carbon tax
accelerates the extraction. In reply to Uplh & Ulph’s (1994) critical review of the driving
assumptions in Sinclair (1992), Sinclair (1994) adds the intuition that a decrease in the
market interest rate postpones extraction. Two more reasons for a decreasing carbon tax
over time are mentioned: One being the irreversibility of burned fossil fuel and the other
the possible emergence of backstop technologies.
In reaction to Sinn’s (2008) findings, several papers have tried to assess the robustness
of the green paradox and evaluate conditions for its emergence. The single country (or
world economy) setting is also used by Gerlagh (2011), who introduces the distinction
between the weak and the strong green paradox. He considers the first to be a situation
which leads to a short-run acceleration with possible medium-run deceleration and the
latter to be a situation in which climate policy actually increases the net present value of
cumulative climate damages.10 Gerlagh (2011, 87) measures cumulative climate damages
7See Sinn (2008, 374).
8See Sinn (2008, 390).
9See Sinn (2008, 375f.).
10See Gerlagh (2011, 82).
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by assigning a time dependent shadow price to timestamped emission quantities. We
adopt this formulation to our two period setting by a lifetime damage function, dependent
on near-term and cumulative emissions, which is additive to consumption utility.
The conditions for the emergence of both kinds of paradoxes in a single country economy
are extensively discussed by van der Ploeg & Withagen (2012). They consider the strong
green paradox a case of a fall in green welfare.11 Green welfare is modeled as the reverse of
the present value of discounted damages, with instantaneous damages being dependent
on CO2 stock. This is qualitatively similar to Gerlagh’s (2011) net present value of
cumulative climate damages.12 They show that a stock-dependent extraction cost may
reduce the set of cases where a strong green paradox arises, especially if the cost of
extracting the last drop of oil is sufficiently high compared to the price of the backstop
technology.13 But even in a situation with a strong green paradox, overall welfare may
increase as a result of subsidizing a green backstop.14
The effect of biofuel subsidies in a two country setting is analyzed by Grafton et al.
(2012). They differentiate between a weak green paradox in the sense of Gerlagh (2011)15
and a green paradox in the long run.16 In line with van der Ploeg & Withagen (2012),
they show that the extraction cost’s sensitivity with respect to the stock level plays a
crucial role in regards to the postponement of the depletion’s point in time.17
Other ways to endogenize the cumulative emissions are: carbon capture and storage,
breaking up the proportionality between extraction and emission,18 a sufficiently high
carbon tax which reduces the fossil fuel demand to zero at some finite time,19 or “elimi-
nating” part of the resource stock.20
11See van der Ploeg & Withagen (2012, 343).
12See van der Ploeg & Withagen (2012, 345).
13See van der Ploeg & Withagen (2012, 348).
14See van der Ploeg & Withagen (2012, 353).
15See Grafton et al. (2012, 338).
16See Grafton et al. (2012, 338).
17See Grafton et al. (2012, 338).
18See e. g. Hoel & Jensen (2012).
19This case assumes, at least implicitly, that fossil fuel is not essential in producing consumption com-
modities. See e. g. Hoel (2012).
20This strategy is analyzed by Harstad (2012) and Hoel (2013).
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While the literature on the green paradox is already very broad, none of the models
that we have mentioned, nor any other model that we are aware of, analyzes the prob-
lem without neglecting at least one of the following three features. (1) Income effects
resulting from redistributed revenues are neglected by partial equilibrium models. These
effects result from revenues (budget losses) generated by carbon taxes or permit trading
systems (backstop subsidies). It is unclear whether the additional (or reduced) consump-
tion induced by the redistribution alters the conditions under which a mitigation policy
becomes beneficial or harmful. Additionally, feedback effects arising from the interaction
with other sectors of the economy, like terms-of-trade and relative price effects discussed
by Di Maria & van der Werf (2008) and van der Werf & Di Maria (2012), are often ne-
glected by partial equilibrium approaches. (2) One-country-models rule out intratemporal
(spatial) carbon leakage. (3) The intertemporal general equilibrium models with multiple
countries typically assume costless extraction, which implies definite full depletion of the
resource stock in finite time.
Our aim is to close this gap by endogenizing cumulative emissions in Eichner & Pethig’s
(2011) model. Eichner & Pethig (2011) are able to assess both intra- and intertemporal
carbon leakage by choosing a three-country-two-period-model21 to analyze the effect of
reducing the size of a binding emissions cap. By neglecting the cost of extraction, the
sum of emissions over both periods is exogenously determined and equal to the initial
stock. We will change this by introducing a stock-dependent marginal extraction cost.
This extends the former key determinants for the occurrence of a green paradox, the price
elasticities of demand for fossil fuel and the intertemporal elasticities of substitution in
consumption, by the elasticities of supply and the user cost in real terms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic as-
sumptions of the model, with a focus on the extension made to Eichner & Pethig (2011),
and derives an initial market equilibrium. In Section 3 we analyze the effects of the
tightening of an emissions cap in the present (period one), while Section 4 presents the
results of an emission reduction in the future (period two). As our paper draws heavily
on Eichner & Pethig’s (2011) model, we occasionally remark how and where our model
and results are distinct from their analysis. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes.
21Fossil fuel supply side (i = F ), abating fossil fuel demand side (i = A), non-abating fossil fuel demand
side (i = N), time up to the medium term (t = 1), and time up to the very long term (t = 2).
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2 The Model
The basic structure of the model follows that of Eichner & Pethig (2011). We adopt
their setting with three countries i = A,F,N and two periods t = 1, 2. Specifically, the
world consists of the fossil fuel exporter F , the emissions abating country A, and the
non-abating country N .22
In order to integrate the idea of the strong green paradox into Eichner & Pethig’s
(2011) model, we modify the assumptions regarding the fossil fuel supply. To be con-
crete, we introduce material cost functions (see equation (1) and equation (2)).23 We
consider the marginal material extraction cost to be negatively correlated with remaining
stock. Formally, we assume that in each period the marginal physical cost is positive and
increases with that period’s extraction (see equation (3)). Furthermore, the physical cost
in the second period increases disproportionately with the first period’s extraction; the
physical user cost is positive and increases with each period’s extraction (see equation
(4)). For a given cumulative extraction, we assume that the total physical cost measured
in commodity units is the higher the less balanced the extraction path is (see equation
(5)).24 Formally, this can be represented as follows:
xE1 =X
E1(eF1), (1)
xE2 =X
E2(eF1, eF2), (2)
XEteFt >0, X
Et
eFteFt
> 0, (3)
XE2eF1 >0, X
E2
eF1eF1
> 0, XE2eF1eF2 = X
E2
eF2eF1
> 0, (4)(
XE2eF1eF1 +
px1
px2
XE1eF1eF1
)
·XE2eF2eF2 >XE2eF1eF2 ·XE2eF2eF1 , (5)
where xEt is the commodity demand of the firm in country F in period t, XEt is the
material cost function of the firm in country F in period t, eFt is the fossil fuel supply
22To assure traceability, we try to follow Eichner & Pethig’s (2011) nomenclature wherever this is
appropriate. This includes terming the only available policy, namely tightening an emissions cap, as
“abatement”, although there is no actual abatement technology or the like in the model.
23These “material cost” functions can also be interpreted as “inverse production” or rather “extraction”
functions. In each period, their outputs were then actual extraction quantity while their inputs were
“material good” (the unique commodity of the world economy) and “current resource stock” (better
tapping possibilities).
24XE2(eF1, eF2) being strictly convex is a sufficient condition for this to hold.
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in period t, XEteFt is the marginal physical cost of the firm in country F in period t, X
E2
eF1
is the physical user cost of the firm in country F ,25 and pxt is the commodity price in
period t.
There is a representative price taking (on its input and output markets) resource ex-
tractor in the fossil fuel exporting country. As in Eichner & Pethig (2011), the market
rate of interest is normalized to zero. The firm has a profit function based on the prior
considerations (see equation (6)) which is maximized with respect to present and future
fossil fuel supply (see equation (7) and equation (8)). The perfectly competitive fossil fuel
world market has to be cleared in each period (see equation (9)). The cumulative emis-
sions are endogenously determined (see equation (10)). Formally, this can be represented
as follows:
ΠF :=
∑
t
[peteFt − pxtXEt(eF1, eF2)], (6)
pe1 =px1X
E1
eF1
+ px2X
E2
eF1
, (7)
pe2 =px2X
E2
eF2
, (8)
eFt =eAt + eNt, (9)
eFΣ =eF1 + eF2, (10)
where ΠF is the profit function of the firm in country F , pet is the fossil fuel price in
period t, eit is the fossil fuel demand of the firm in i = A,N in period t, and eFΣ is the
endogenously determined cumulative fossil fuel extraction.
As the aim of this paper is to analyze changes in the timing of emissions and the
quantity of cumulative emissions, we limit our analysis to cases in which the cumulative
extraction is strictly less than the world’s physical fossil fuel stock. This means we
implicitly assume that the intratemporal marginal extraction cost rises faster when the
remaining stock reaches depletion, than marginal production rises when resource input
falls to zero.
In what follows, the elasticities of supply for fossil fuel play an important role. Formally,
these can be represented as follows:
ηF1,1 =
px1X
E1
eF1
+ px2X
E2
eF1
px1eF1XE1eF1eF1 + px2eF1X
E2
eF1eF1
, (11)
25Since we only consider interior solutions in which the resource stock is not fully depleted, this in-
tertemporal cross effect is the key dynamic of the model.
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ηF2,1 =
px1X
E1
eF1
+ px2X
E2
eF1
px2eF2XE2eF1eF2
, (12)
ηF1,2 =
px2X
E2
eF2
px2eF1XE2eF2eF1
, (13)
ηF2,2 =
px2X
E2
eF2
px2eF2XE2eF2eF2
, (14)
where ηFs,t := deFsdpet ·
pet
eFs
> 0 is for s = t the intertemporal and for s = t the intratemporal
price elasticity of supply for fossil fuel of the firm in country F in period s.
The policy tools we analyze in the subsequent sections are marginal changes in the
emissions cap of the abating country today and tomorrow. We only discuss situations
in which an emissions trading scheme exists (in period one) and is assumed to persist
(in period two), like e. g. the European Union Emission Trading Scheme. Formally, this
represents as follows:
eA1 = eA1 and eA2 = eA2, (15)
where eAt is the exogenously given (politically determined) fossil fuel demand of the firm
in country A in period t.
Apart from the existence of the emissions cap, the fossil fuel demanding countries
are considered to be symmetric. There are representative price taking (on its input
and output markets) commodity producers with identical production functions in each
country and period. These functions are increasing and strictly concave in fossil fuel
demand (see equation (16) and equation (17)). A permit price has to be paid for each
unit of fossil fuel consumed in the abating country in each period. Each firm has a profit
function based on the above considerations (see equation (18) and equation (19)) which
is maximized with respect to present and future commodity consumption (see equation
(20) and equation (21)). The perfectly competitive commodity world market has to be
cleared in each period (see equation (22)). Formally, this can be represented as follows:
xsAt =X
At(eAt), (16)
xsNt =X
Nt(eNt), (17)
ΠA :=
∑
t
[pxtX
At(eAt)− (pet + πt)eAt], (18)
ΠN :=
∑
t
[pxtX
Nt(eNt)− peteNt], (19)
π1 =px1X
A1
eA1
− pe1 ≥ 0 and π2 = px2XA2eA2 − pe2 ≥ 0, (20)
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px1X
N1
eN1
=pe1 and px2XN2eN2 = pe2, (21)
xsAt + x
s
Nt =xAt + xNt + xFt + xEt, (22)
where xsit is the commodity supply of the firm in i = A,N in period t, X i(eit) is the
production function of the firm in i = A,N in period t, Πi is the profit function of the
firm in i = A,N , πt is the permit price in period t, X ieit is the marginal physical product
of the firm in i = A,N in period t, and xit is the commodity demand of the households
in i = A,F,N and the resource extractor E in period t.
In contrast to Eichner & Pethig’s (2011) model,26 in our model the initial equilibrium
on the fossil fuel market is characterized by the fossil fuel prices being determined by the
demand side’s and the supply side’s optimality conditions and an extraction of all fossil
fuel reserves,27 meaning those fossil fuel resources which are worthwhile extracting given
their extraction cost.
The model is closed by the commodity demand of the households. There are represen-
tative lifetime utility maximizing households with identical lifetime utility functions in
each country (see equation (23)). Lifetime utility is considered to be increasing, quasi-
concave, and homothetic in present and future commodity consumption. In each country,
the lifetime income, consisting of the maximized profit of the firm and the permit rev-
enues in the case of the abating fossil fuel demand side, is considered as lump sum and
used to finance lifetime consumption (see equation (24)). The straightforward analytical
result is that each intertemporal marginal rate of substitution has to be equal to the
intertemporal price ratio in equilibrium (see equation (25)). Formally, this represents as
follows:
ui = U(xi1, xi2), i = A,F,N, (23)
∑
t
pxtxit =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
= ΠA∗ + π1eA1 + π2eA2
= Πi∗
, i = F,N, (24)
26Where the initial equilibrium on the fossil fuel market is characterized by a determination of the
intertemporal fossil fuel price by the demand side’s optimality conditions and an extraction of all
fossil fuel resources.
27“Reserves are those quantities of hydrocarbons which are anticipated to be commercially recovered
from known accumulations from a given date forward” (Society of Petroleum Engineers 2005, 11).
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Uxi1
Uxi2
=
px1
px2
, i = A,F,N, (25)
where ui is the lifetime utility of the households, U(xi1, xi2) is its lifetime utility function,
Πi∗ is the maximized profit of the firm in i = A,F,N , and Uxit is the marginal utility of
the households in period t.
To better understand the relationship between changes in commodity prices and com-
modity demands induced by tightening the emissions caps, we limit our analysis to life-
time utility functions with constant intertemporal elasticities of substitution (see equation
(26)). Applying them in the optimality conditions (see equation (25)), the relative com-
modity demand of the households can be derived (see equation (27)). Formally, this
represents as follows:
U(xi1, xi2) = (α1x
−b
i1 + α2x
−b
i2 )
−h
b , i = A,F,N, (26)
xi1
xi2
=
(
α2px1
α1px2
)σ
, i = A,F,N, (27)
where σ := 1/(−b− 1) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
In order to derive conditions under which the strong green paradox occurs due to a
“green” policy, we weight changes of present and cumulative emissions with the following
climate damage function:
D(eF1, eFΣ) =
(
c1e
d
F1 + c2e
d
FΣ
) ι
d
, (28)
dD(eF1, eFΣ)  0 ⇔ deF1 + λ deFΣ  0, (29)
where λ := c2
c1
·
(
eFΣ
eF1
)d−1
> 0 is the relative weight attached to changes in cumulative
emissions.
3 Acting Today
Tightening the cap in the first period (deA1 < 0) causes carbon leakage (deN1/ deA1 < 0)
and can even lead to the weak green paradox (deF1/ deA1 < 0). A cumulative extraction
expansion (deFΣ/ deA1 < 0) and the strong green paradox (dD/ deA1 < 0) can emerge,
depending on the occurrence of the weak green paradox. The solution strategy for the
comparative statics in both periods is as follows: We start with analyzing the changes on
the fossil fuel market, proceed with observing the effects on the commodity market, and
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close by combining our results.28 On the former market, tightening the cap in the first
period has an impact on the fossil fuel extraction in period one:29
deF1 =deA1︸︷︷︸
[1]
− Γ0 − pe1[pe2 +X
E2
eF2eF2
eN2|ηN2|]
Γ0︸ ︷︷ ︸
[2]
deA1 −
XE2eF1eN1|ηN1| [pe2 +XE2eF2eF2eN2|ηN2|]
Γ0︸ ︷︷ ︸
[3]
dpx2
(30a)
=
pe1[pe2 +X
E2
eF2eF2
eN2|ηN2|]
Γ0
deA1 −
XE2eF1eN1|ηN1| [pe2 +XE2eF2eF2eN2|ηN2|]
Γ0
dpx2, (30b)
where Γ0 = pe2eN2|ηN2|pe1eN1|ηN1|eF1ηF1,2eF2ηF2,1 ·
[(
eF1ηF1,2
eN2|ηN2| +
eF1ηF1,2
eF2ηF2,2
)
·
(
eF2ηF2,1
eN1|ηN1| +
eF2ηF2,1
eF1ηF1,1
)
− 1
]
> 0 and
ηNt :=
XNteNt
eNtXNteNteNt
< 0 is the price elasticity of demand for fossil fuel of the firm in country
N in period t.
Proposition 1. If (26) holds and the abating country A tightens its emissions cap
(deA1 < 0),
• the commodity price in period two falls (dpx2 < 0),
• the emissions in the first period either decline by less than deA1
(
deF1
deA1
∈]0, 1[
)
or
they increase
(
deF1
deA1
< 0
)
,
• and the present fossil fuel price falls (dpe1 < 0).
Proof. See appendix A.3, equation (A.36); appendix A.3, equation (A.28); appendix
A.3, equation (A.38). 
It can be shown that the commodity price in period two decreases relative to the
commodity price in period one (dpx2 < 0). The intuition is that due to the demand
reduction of the abating country, fossil fuel and thus the commodity which is produced
using fossil fuel becomes scarcer in the first period. This means that the demand for and
the supply of the commodity fall apart, resulting in a higher present and a lower future
commodity price. Therefore, the commodity producer in the non-abating country shifts
his commodity supply and thus his fossil fuel demand from the second to the first period.
Furthermore, it can be shown that the present fossil fuel price decreases (dpe1 < 0). On
the one hand, the demand for fossil fuel in period one declines (caused by deA1 < 0). On
the other hand, its supply decreases if and only if the potential rise in the physical user cost
outweighs the fall in the commodity price in period two (if and only if d
(
px2X
E2
eF1
)
> 0).
28This method is also adopted from Eichner & Pethig (2011).
29See appendix A.1, equation (A.19). Throughout the rest of the article the commodity in period one is
chosen as numeraire.
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Nevertheless, the demand reduction is always greater than the potential supply reduction.
Whether the future fossil fuel price increases or decreases is ambiguous (dpe2  0). On
the one hand, the demand for fossil fuel in period two declines (caused by dpx2 < 0).
On the other hand, its supply increases if and only if the fall in the commodity price
outweighs the potential rise in the marginal physical cost in period two (if and only if
d
(
px2X
E2
eF2
)
< 0).
In conclusion, the demand reduction of the abating country in the first period (term
[1] of equation (30a)) is accompanied by two effects, which counteract its effectiveness.
Firstly, there is a carbon price effect equal to term [2] of equation (30a). This reflects
the fossil fuel demand increase of the firm in the non-abating country due to the fall in
the fossil fuel price in period one. The carbon price effect causes positive carbon leakage
([2] > 0) but cannot cause the weak green paradox on its own ([2] < 1).
Secondly, there is a relative price effect of carbon intensive goods equal to term [3] of
equation (30a). This reflects the relative fossil fuel demand decrease of the firm in the
non-abating country due to the fall in the relative price of the commodity in period two.
In conjunction with the carbon price effect the relative price effect of carbon intensive
goods can cause the weak green paradox. The impact on the cumulative extraction can
be represented as follows:30
deFΣ =
pe1Γ1
Γ0
deA1 −
XE2eF1eN1|ηN1|Γ1
Γ0
dpx2, (31)
where Γ1 = pe2eN2|ηN2|eF1ηF1,2 ·
(
eF1ηF1,2
eN2|ηN2| +
eF1ηF1,2
eF2ηF2,2
− 1
)
.
Proposition 2. If (26) holds and the abating country A tightens its emissions cap
(deA1 < 0), the cumulative emissions either decline by less than deA1
(
deFΣ
deA1
∈]0, 1[
)
or
they increase
(
deFΣ
deA1
< 0
)
if Γ1 ≥ 0.
Proof. The second term of (31) is greater than or equal to zero if Γ1 ≥ 0 since
dpx2 < 0. The first term of (31) is greater than minus one since
pe1Γ1 =
pe2eN2|ηN2|
eF1ηF1,2
·
(
eF1ηF1,2
eN2|ηN2| +
eF1ηF1,2
eF2ηF2,2
− 1
)
· pe1
< Γ0 =
pe2eN2|ηN2| pe1eN1|ηN1|
eF1ηF1,2eF2ηF2,1
·
⎡⎣( eF1ηF1,2
eN2|ηN2| +
eF1ηF1,2
eF2ηF2,2
)
·
(
eF2ηF2,1
eN1|ηN1| +
eF2ηF2,1
eF1ηF1,1
)
− 1
⎤⎦
30See appendix A.1, equation (A.21).
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⇔ 0 <pe2eN2|ηN2| pe1eN1|ηN1|
eF1ηF1,2eF2ηF2,1
·
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(
eF1ηF1,2
eN2|ηN2| +
eF1ηF1,2
eF2ηF2,2
)
·
(
eF2ηF2,1
eF1ηF1,1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1
+
(
eF2ηF2,1
eN1|ηN1|
)
− 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
Therefore, deFΣ is greater than deA1 if Γ1 ≥ 0. 
It can be shown that the cumulative emissions will not decline by more than deA1 if
the reciprocal of the intertemporal price semi-elasticity of supply for fossil fuel in period
one
(
1
eF1ηF1,2
)
is less than the sum of the reciprocals of the intratemporal price semi-
elasticities of demand and supply for fossil fuel in period two
(
1
eN2|ηN2| +
1
eF2ηF2,2
)
(if
Γ1 > 0).31 On the contrary, in this case they will increase if the positive effect due to
the fall in the commodity price in period two outweighs the negative effect due to the
tightening of the emissions cap
(∣∣∣ dpx2deA1 ∣∣∣ > pe1XE2eF1eN1|ηN1|
)
.
Whether the weak and the strong green paradox occur or not depends on the change
in the future commodity price (dpx2). In order to derive the change in the future com-
modity price following the demand reductions and the changes in fossil fuel supply
(dpx2(deA1, deA2, deF1, deF2)), the commodity market is now taken into account. The
resulting changes do not only depend on the households’ preferences, but also on the
resource owner’s material cost function. It can be shown that the relative change in
the future commodity price depends: on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the
permit prices, the future commodity price, the commodity demand of the households,
the physical user cost, the demand reductions, and the change in the present fossil fuel
supply. Formally, this can be represented as follows:32
dpx2 =
px2
σ
(
π1
xsA1 + x
s
N1 − xE1
deA1 − π2
px2(xsA2 + x
s
N2 − xE2)
deA2 +ΘdeF1
)
, (32)
where Θ =
px2XE2eF1
xsA1+x
s
N1−xE1 +
px2XE2eF1
px2(xsA2+x
s
N2−xE2) .
Finally, combining the results from the fossil fuel market with the results from the
commodity market (for deA2 = 0), the change in fossil fuel supply in the first period
(deF1/ deA1), the change in fossil fuel supply in the second period (deF2/ deA1), the change
in the cumulative extraction (deFΣ/ deA1), and the change in the cumulative climate
31These terms are semi-elasticities in the following sense: They measure absolute changes in quantities
in relation to relative changes in prices.
32See appendix A.2, equation (A.27).
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damages (dD/ deA1) with respect to the demand reduction in the present can be deduced
and analyzed for algebraic signs.33
Thereby, conditions for the occurrence of the weak (deF1/ deA1 < 0) and the strong
green paradox (dD/ deA1 < 0) in response to tightening the emissions cap in the first
period can be simplified to the following inequalities:
deF1
deA1
 0 ⇔ σ  σ = px2X
E2
eF1
pe1
· π1eN1|ηN1|
xsA1 + x
s
N1 − xE1
, (33)
dD
deA1
 0 ⇔ σ
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
 σ = px2X
E2
eF1
pe1
· π1eN1|ηN1|xsA1+xsN1−xE1 if Γ
D
1 > 0
 σ = px2X
E2
eF1
pe1
· π1eN1|ηN1|xsA1+xsN1−xE1 if Γ
D
1 < 0
, (34)
where ΓD1 =
pe2eN2|ηN2|
eF1ηF1,2
·
(
1+λ
λ
· eF1ηF1,2
eN2|ηN2| +
1+λ
λ
· eF1ηF1,2
eF2ηF2,2
− 1
)
> Γ1.
From equation (33) and (34) we infer the following proposition:
Proposition 3. If (26) holds and the abating country A tightens its emissions cap
(deA1 < 0), the weak and the strong green paradox occur under the following conditions:
deF1 > 0 deF1 < 0
dD > 0 σ < σ and ΓD1 > 0 σ > σ and ΓD1 < 0
dD < 0 σ < σ and ΓD1 < 0 σ > σ and ΓD1 > 0
Our condition for the occurrence of the weak green paradox is stronger but closely
related to Eichner & Pethig’s (2011). With the marginal extraction cost, the physical
user cost in real terms complement the equation (px2XE2eF1/pe1 < 1). The inequality sign
and the rest of the condition are the same as in Eichner & Pethig’s (2011) model. If
the elasticity of demand and the intratemporal (intertemporal) elasticity of supply for
fossil fuel in the second (first) period are relatively small (large) and if the relative weight
attached to changes in cumulative emissions is relatively small (if ΓD1 > 0), the occurrence
of the weak will coincide with the occurrence of the strong green paradox (first and forth
quadrant of the matrix). Otherwise, the cumulative climate damages will either change
contrarily to the emissions in the first period (if ΓD1 < 0, second and third quadrant of the
matrix) or remain unaltered (if ΓD1 = 0). Present and cumulative emissions will increase
simultaneously if and only if σ < σ and Γ1 > 0.34
33See appendix A.3, equations (A.28), (A.29), (A.30), and (A.31).
34See equation (33) and appendix A.3, equation (A.30).
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4 Acting Tomorrow
In what follows, the effects of a change in the future emissions cap are analyzed. This
action is announced credibly today and thus influences consumption and production deci-
sions in the first period. Analogously to the demand reduction in the present, tightening
the cap in the second period (deA2 < 0) can cause carbon leakage (deN1/ deA2 < 0) and
can even lead to the weak green paradox (deF1/ deA2 < 0). Contrary to the analysis in
the previous section, there can be negative cumulative carbon leakage (deFΣ/ deA2 > 1).
A cumulative extraction expansion (deFΣ/ deA2 < 0) and the strong green paradox
(dD/ deA2 < 0) can still emerge, but no longer depends on the occurrence of the weak
green paradox. We start again by analyzing the changes on the fossil fuel market. Tight-
ening the cap in the second period has an impact on the fossil fuel extraction in period
one:35
deF1 =− deA2︸︷︷︸
[1]
+
Γ0 − pe2px2XE2eF1eF2eN1|ηN1|
Γ0︸ ︷︷ ︸
[2]
deA2 −
XE2eF1eN1|ηN1| [pe2 +XE2eF2eF2eN2|ηN2|]
Γ0︸ ︷︷ ︸
[3]
dpx2
(35a)
=− pe2px2X
E2
eF1eF2
eN1|ηN1|
Γ0
deA2 −
XE2eF1eN1|ηN1| [pe2 +XE2eF2eF2eN2|ηN2|]
Γ0
dpx2. (35b)
Proposition 4. If (26) holds and the abating country A tightens its emissions cap
(deA2 < 0),
• the commodity price in period two rises (dpx2 > 0),
• and the weak green paradox occurs
(
deF1
deA2
< 0
)
if and only if the present fossil fuel
price falls (dpe1 < 0).
Proof. See appendix A.3, equation (A.37); appendix A.3, equation (A.32) and (A.40).

It can be shown that the commodity price in period two increases relative to the com-
modity price in period one (dpx2 > 0). The intuition is the same as in the previous
section. Therefore, the commodity producer in the non-abating country shifts his com-
modity supply and thus his fossil fuel demand from the first to the second period.
Furthermore, it can be shown that the weak green paradox occurs if and only if the
present fossil fuel price decreases (deF1/ dpe1 < 0). With given demand for fossil fuel in
period one, its supply thus has to increase. This is the case if and only if the potential
35See appendix A.1, equation (A.19).
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fall in the physical user cost outweighs the rise in the commodity price in period two (if
and only if d
(
px2X
E2
eF1
)
< 0). Whether the future fossil fuel price increases or decreases is
ambiguous (dpe2  0). On the one hand, the demand for fossil fuel in the abating country
in period two declines (caused by deA2 < 0). On the other hand, the demand for fossil
fuel in the non-abating country in period two rises (caused by dpx2 > 0). Furthermore, its
supply increases if and only if the potential fall in the marginal physical cost outweighs
the rise in the commodity price in period two (if and only if d
(
px2X
E2
eF2
)
< 0).
Analogously to the previous section, the demand reduction of the abating country
in the second period (term [1] of equation (35a)) is accompanied by two effects, which
counteract its effectiveness in regards to increasing present emissions.
Firstly, there is a carbon price effect equal to term [2] of equation (35a). The carbon
price effect causes negative carbon leakage ([2] > 0) but cannot prevent the weak green
paradox on its own ([2] < 1).
Secondly, there is a relative price effect of carbon intensive goods equal to term [3]
of equation (35a). In conjunction with the carbon price effect the relative price effect
of carbon intensive goods can prevent the weak green paradox. The impact on the
cumulative extraction can be represented as follows:36
deFΣ =
pe2Γ2
Γ0
deA2 −
XE2eF1eN1|ηN1|Γ1
Γ0
dpx2, (36)
where Γ2 = pe1eN1|ηN1|eF2ηF2,1 ·
(
eF2ηF2,1
eN1|ηN1| +
eF2ηF2,1
eF1ηF1,1
− 1
)
.
Proposition 5. If (26) holds and the abating country A tightens its emissions cap
(deA2 < 0), the cumulative emissions
• either decline by less than deA2
(
deFΣ
deA2
∈]0, 1[
)
or they increase
(
deFΣ
deA2
< 0
)
if Γ1 ≤
0,
• and they decline
(
deFΣ
deA2
> 0
)
if Γ1 > 0 and Γ2 ≥ 0.
Proof. The second term of (36) is greater than or equal to zero if Γ1 ≤ 0 since
dpx2 > 0. The first term of (36) is greater than minus one since
pe2Γ2 =
pe1eN1|ηN1|
eF2ηF2,1
·
(
eF2ηF2,1
eN1|ηN1| +
eF2ηF2,1
eF1ηF1,1
− 1
)
· pe2
< Γ0 =
pe2eN2|ηN2| pe1eN1|ηN1|
eF1ηF1,2eF2ηF2,1
·
⎡⎣( eF1ηF1,2
eN2|ηN2| +
eF1ηF1,2
eF2ηF2,2
)
·
(
eF2ηF2,1
eN1|ηN1| +
eF2ηF2,1
eF1ηF1,1
)
− 1
⎤⎦
36See appendix A.1, equation (A.21).
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⇔ 0 <pe2eN2|ηN2| pe1eN1|ηN1|
eF1ηF1,2eF2ηF2,1
·
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(
eF2ηF2,1
eN1|ηN1| +
eF2ηF2,1
eF1ηF1,1
)
·
(
eF1ηF1,2
eF2ηF2,2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1
+
(
eF1ηF1,2
eN2|ηN2|
)
− 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
Therefore, deFΣ is greater than deA2 if Γ1 ≤ 0.
The second term of (36) is less than zero if Γ1 > 0 since dpx2 > 0. The first term of (36)
is less than or equal to zero if Γ2 ≥ 0. Therefore, deFΣ is less than zero if Γ1 > 0 and
Γ2 ≥ 0.

It can be shown that the cumulative emissions will not decline by more than deA2
if Γ1 is less than zero. On the contrary, in this case they will increase if either the
reciprocal of the intertemporal price semi-elasticity of supply for fossil fuel in period two(
1
eF2ηF2,1
)
is greater than or equal to the sum of the reciprocals of the intratemporal price
semi-elasticities of demand and supply for fossil fuel in period one
(
1
eN1|ηN1| +
1
eF1ηF1,1
)
(if Γ2 ≤ 0) or Γ2 is greater than zero and the positive effect due to the tightening of
the emissions cap outweighs the negative effect due to the rise in the commodity price in
period two
(∣∣∣ dpx2deA1 ∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣Γ2Γ1 ∣∣∣ pe2XE2eF1eN1|ηN1|
)
. Furthermore, the cumulative emissions will not
increase if Γ1 and Γ2 are greater than or equal to zero.
Analogously to the analysis in the previous section, the commodity market is now
taken into account. Equation (32) is applied again; however, this time today’s cap is hold
constant (deA1 = 0).
Finally, combining the results from the fossil fuel market with the results from the
commodity market, the change in fossil fuel supply in the first period (deF1/ deA2), the
change in fossil fuel supply in the second period (deF2/ deA2), the change in the cumulative
extraction (deFΣ/ deA2), and the change in the cumulative climate damages (dD/ deA2),
following the demand reduction in the future, can be deduced and analyzed for algebraic
signs.37
Similar to the demand reduction in the present, conditions for the occurrence of the
weak (deF1/ deA2 < 0) and the strong green paradox (dD/ deA2 < 0) induced by tighten-
ing the emissions cap in the second period can be derived:
deF1
deA2
 0 ⇔ σ  σ˜1 =
px2X
E2
eF1
pe1
· π2eN2|ηN2|
px2(xsA2 + x
s
N2 − xE2)
·
(
eF2ηF2,1
eN2|ηN2| +
eF2ηF2,1
eF2ηF2,2
)
, (37)
37See appendix A.3, equations (A.32), (A.33), (A.34), and (A.35).
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dD
deA2
 0 ⇔ σ
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 σ˜D =
px2X
E2
eF1
pe1
· π2eN2|ηN2|
px2(xsA2 + x
s
N2 − xE2)⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
− Γ
D
2
pe1eN1|ηN1|
ΓD1
pe2eN2|ηN2| +
Θ
π2eN2|ηN2|
px2(xsA2+x
s
N2−xE2)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
if ΓD2 > 0
 σ˜D =
px2X
E2
eF1
pe1
· π2eN2|ηN2|
px2(xsA2 + x
s
N2 − xE2)⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
− Γ
D
2
pe1eN1|ηN1|
ΓD1
pe2eN2|ηN2| +
Θ
π2eN2|ηN2|
px2(xsA2+x
s
N2−xE2)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
if ΓD2 < 0
, (38)
where ΓD2 =
pe1eN1|ηN1|
eF2ηF2,1
·
(
eF2ηF2,1
eN1|ηN1| +
eF2ηF2,1
eF1ηF1,1
− 1+λ
λ
)
< Γ2.
From equation (37) and (38) we infer the following proposition:
Proposition 6. If (26) holds and the abating country A tightens its emissions cap
(deA2 < 0), the weak and the strong green paradox occur under the following conditions:
deF1 > 0 deF1 < 0
dD > 0 σ > σ˜D and ΓD2 < 0 σ < σ˜D and ΓD2 > 0
dD < 0
σ˜D > σ > σ˜1 and ΓD2 < 0 σ˜D < σ < σ˜1 and ΓD2 > 0
or σ > σ˜1 and ΓD2 > 0 or σ < σ˜1 and ΓD2 < 0
Proof. σ˜1  σ˜D is equivalent to ΓD2  0 since
σ˜1  σ˜D ⇔
(
eF2ηF2,1
eN2|ηN2| +
eF2ηF2,1
eF2ηF2,2
)

⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
ΓD1
pe2eN2|ηN2| +
Θ
π2eN2|ηN2|
px2(x
s
A2
+xs
N2
−xE2)
− ΓD2pe1eN1|ηN1|
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
⇔ 0
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
 Γ0
pe1eN1|ηN1|pe2eN2|ηN2|
eF2ηF2,1
+ Θ
π2eN2|ηN2|
px2(x
s
A2
+xs
N2
−xE2)
if ΓD2 > 0
 Γ0
pe1eN1|ηN1|pe2eN2|ηN2|
eF2ηF2,1
+ Θ
π2eN2|ηN2|
px2(x
s
A2
+xs
N2
−xE2)
if ΓD2 < 0
.

Our condition for the occurrence of the weak green paradox is again closely related
to Eichner & Pethig’s (2011). With marginal extraction cost, the physical user cost
in real terms weaken the condition (px2XE2eF1/pe1 < 1). If the elasticity of demand and
the intratemporal (intertemporal) elasticity of supply for fossil fuel in the second period
are relatively large (small) (last term of equation (37) < 1), it will be weakened further.
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Otherwise, the condition will either be strengthened (last term of equation (37) > 1)
or remain unaltered (last term of equation (37) = 1). The inequality sign and the rest
of the condition are the same as in Eichner & Pethig’s (2011) model. If the elasticity
of demand and the intratemporal (intertemporal) elasticity of supply for fossil fuel in
the first (second) period are relatively large (small) and if the relative weight attached
to changes in cumulative emissions is relatively small (if ΓD2 < 0), the occurrence of
the strong will induce the occurrence of the weak green paradox (first quadrant of the
matrix). Otherwise, the emissions in the first period will decrease if the cumulative
climate damages increase (if ΓD2 > 0, second quadrant of the matrix).38 Present and
cumulative emissions will increase simultaneously if and only if σ > σ˜Σ and Γ2 < 0. 39
5 Concluding Remarks
There are several reasons why public policies against global warming can have effects con-
trary to their intended aims. Carbon leakage can lead to intratemporal and intertemporal
shifts in greenhouse gas emissions from the abating countries to the non-abating coun-
tries. Even within the abating countries, emissions might only be shifted intertemporally
rather than there being an actual emission reduction for any abatement policies other
than binding and persistent quantity restrictions. Resource owners may feel threatened
by ambitious climate objectives and shift their extraction to the present so as not to be
left with the bulk of their mineral deposits. Furthermore, previously untouched resources
may become valuable reserves and may be extracted sooner or later due to possible price
rises in coal, oil, and other fossil fuels.
We integrate a marginal extraction cost which is increasing in present, future, and
cumulative supply into Eichner & Pethig’s (2011) model. Through this, the cumulative
fossil fuel extraction becomes endogenously determined. In our model, the qualitative
results concerning the weak green paradox remain unaltered and the elasticities of demand
still play an important role (see equations (33) and (37)). But if the emissions cap is
38This is never fulfilled if ΓD1 ≥ 0.
39Where σ˜Σ =
px2X
E2
eF1
pe1
· π2eN2|ηN2|px2(xsA2+xsN2−xE2) ·
⎡⎢⎣
⎛⎝ Γ1
pe2eN2|ηN2| +
Θ
π2eN2|ηN2|
px2(x
s
A2
+xs
N2
−xE2)
⎞⎠ · (− Γ2pe1eN1|ηN1|)−1
⎤⎥⎦. See
appendix A.3, equation (A.34). σ˜1 < σ˜Σ if and only if Γ2 < 0 whereby the proof is equivalent to that
above. See also equation (37).
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tightened in the first period, the condition for its occurrence is strengthened due to the
physical user cost in real terms (see equation (33); these are smaller than one). And if
the emissions cap is tightened in the second period, not only the user cost but also the
elasticities of supply in the second period play an important role for the condition for the
occurrence of the weak green paradox (see equation (37)).
Furthermore, we derive conditions under which the cumulative climate damages in-
crease due to a “green” policy. The results crucially depend on the elasticities of supply
and the relative weight attached to changes in cumulative emissions (see equations (34)
and (38)). If the elasticity of demand and the intratemporal (intertemporal) elasticity of
supply for fossil fuel in the second (first) period are relatively small (large) and if the rela-
tive weight attached to changes in cumulative emissions is relatively small (ΓD1 > 0), then
the strong green paradox will occur due to a tightening of the emissions cap in the first
period if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is smaller than some threshold level
(σ < σ). Otherwise (ΓD1 < 0), it will occur if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
is larger than this threshold level (σ > σ). Following a tightening of the emissions cap
in the second period, if the elasticity of demand and the intratemporal (intertemporal)
elasticity of supply for fossil fuel in the first (second) period are relatively large (small)
and if the relative weight attached to changes in cumulative emissions is relatively small
(ΓD2 < 0), then the cumulative climate damages will increase if the intertemporal elastic-
ity of substitution is larger than some threshold level (σ > σ˜D). Otherwise (ΓD2 > 0), they
will increase if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is smaller than this threshold
level (σ < σ˜D).
Comparing our results to those derived in the literature, two features stand out. First,
adopted from Eichner & Pethig (2011), we show that both paradoxes can not only arise as
a result of announcing future actions (Section 4), but can also be induced by immediate
actions (Section 3). Second, in the literature which considers increasing marginal ex-
traction cost (or multiple resource pools with constant but different marginal extraction
costs) and carbon demand reducing policies, enhancing climate engagements do not lead
to increasing cumulative emissions.40 An exception are Hoel & Jensen (2012, 689ff.) who
state that total emissions could increase; however, the net present value of cumulative
40See Fischer & Salant (2012, 17ff.), Gerlagh (2011, 89ff.), Grafton et al. (2012, 337ff.), Hoel (2012,
210ff.), and van der Ploeg & Withagen (2012, 351ff.).
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climate damages would decrease in their setting. Even Fischer & Salant (2013, 9ff.), who
consider demand and supply side reactions, find decreasing cumulative emissions due to
carbon demand reducing policies in the case that the emissions per unit output are the
same for all resources. In our model, cumulative emissions can increase and be carried
out earlier simultaneously as a reaction to a policy measure, thus inducing a very strong
form of the green paradox. This stems from our formulation of the extraction cost, which
differs from the existing literature on the strong green paradox. Given this formulation,
the relative price effect of carbon intensive goods41 may alter the resource extraction path
since the unique commodity serves as input in the resource extraction process. This leads
to supply side reactions that are absent from the existing literature on the strong green
paradox.
A Appendix
A.1 The Fossil Fuel Market
Throughout the appendix the commodity in period one is chosen as numeraire. Rearranging of
(7)-(9), (20), and (21) yields:
pe1 −XE1eF1 − px2XE2eF1 = 0, (A.1)
pe2 − px2XE2eF2 = 0, (A.2)
eFt − eAt − eNt = 0, t = 1, 2, (A.3)
XA1eA1 − pe1 − π1 = 0, (A.4)
px2X
A2
eA2
− pe2 − π2 = 0, (A.5)
XN1eN1 − pe1 = 0, (A.6)
px2X
N2
eN2
− pe2 = 0. (A.7)
Total differentiation of (A.1)-(A.7) yields:
dpe1 −XE1eF1eF1 deF1 −XE2eF1 dpx2 − px2[XE2eF1eF1 deF1 +XE2eF1eF2 deF2] = 0, (A.8)
dpe2 −XE2eF2 dpx2 − px2[XE2eF2eF1 deF1 +XE2eF2eF2 deF2] = 0, (A.9)
deFt − deAt − deNt = 0, t = 1, 2, (A.10)
XA1eA1eA1 deA1 − dpe1 − dπ1 = 0, (A.11)
XA2eA2 dpx2 + px2X
A2
eA2eA2
deA2 − dpe2 − dπ2 = 0, (A.12)
41Term [3] of equation (30a) and (35a).
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êN1
p̂e1
− ηN1 = 0, (A.13)
êN2
p̂e2 − p̂x2 − ηN2 = 0, (A.14)
where ηNt :=
XNteNt
eNtXNteNteNt
< 0 for t = 1, 2.
Inserting (A.13) and (A.14) in (A.10) and afterwards inserting in (A.8)-(A.9) yields:
dpe1 −XE1eF1eF1 [deA1 + eN1ηN1p̂e1]−XE2eF1 dpx2 (A.15)
−px2[XE2eF1eF1 [deA1 + eN1ηN1p̂e1] +XE2eF1eF2 [deA2 + eN2ηN2[p̂e2 − p̂x2]]] = 0,
dpe2 −XE2eF2 dpx2 (A.16)
−px2[XE2eF2eF1 [deA1 + eN1ηN1p̂e1] +XE2eF2eF2 [deA2 + eN2ηN2[p̂e2 − p̂x2]]] = 0.
Inserting (A.15) in (A.16) yields:
dpe1 =−
pe1
eN1ηN1
[Γ0 − pe1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]]
Γ0
deA1 (A.17)
+
pe1pe2px2X
E2
eF1eF2
Γ0
deA2 +
pe1X
E2
eF1
[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
Γ0
dpx2,
dpe2 =
pe1pe2px2X
E2
eF2eF1
Γ0
deA1 (A.18)
−
pe2
eN2ηN2
[Γ0 − pe2[pe1 − [XE1eF1eF1 + px2XE2eF1eF1 ]eN1ηN1]]
Γ0
deA2 +
XE2eF2Γ3
Γ0
dpx2,
where Γ0 = [pe1− [XE1eF1eF1 +px2XE2eF1eF1 ]eN1ηN1][pe2−px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]−px2XE2eF1eF2eN1ηN1 ·
px2X
E2
eF2eF1
eN2ηN2 and Γ3 = Γ0 +
px2XE2eF1
pe2
· px2XE2eF2eF1eN1ηN1 · pe2.
Inserting (A.13) and (A.14) in (A.10) and afterwards inserting (A.17) and (A.18) yields:
deF1 =
pe1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
Γ0
deA1 +
pe2px2X
E2
eF1eF2
eN1ηN1
Γ0
deA2 (A.19)
+
XE2eF1eN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
Γ0
dpx2,
deF2 =
pe1px2X
E2
eF2eF1
eN2ηN2
Γ0
deA1 +
pe2[pe1 − [XE1eF1eF1 + px2XE2eF1eF1 ]eN1ηN1]
Γ0
deA2 (A.20)
+
XE2eF1eN1ηN1[px2X
E2
eF2eF1
eN2ηN2]
Γ0
dpx2.
Adding (A.19)-(A.20) yields:
deF1 + deF2 = deFΣ =
pe1Γ1
Γ0
deA1 +
pe2Γ2
Γ0
deA2 +
XE2eF1eN1ηN1Γ1
Γ0
dpx2, (A.21)
where Γ1 = pe2 + [px2XE2eF2eF1 − px2XE2eF2eF2 ]eN2ηN2 and Γ2 = pe1 − [XE1eF1eF1 + px2XE2eF1eF1 −
px2X
E2
eF1eF2
]eN1ηN1.
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A.2 The Commodity Market
The relative commodity demand of A,N, F and E is equal to:
qd =
∑
xi1∑
xi2
=
xA1 + xN1 + xF1 +X
E1
xA2 + xN2 + xF2 +XE2
, i = A,N, F,E. (A.22)
Inserting (22) and (27) in (A.22) yields:
qd =
(
α1px2
α2
)σ
−
(
α1px2
α2
)σ XE2
XA2 +XN2
+
XE1
XA2 +XN2
. (A.23)
Total differentiation of (A.23) and afterwards inserting (A.1)-(A.7) and (27) yields:
dqd =
(
α1px2
α2
)σ
σp̂x2 −
(
α1px2
α2
)σ
σp̂x2
XE2
XA2 +XN2
(A.24)
−
(
α1px2
α2
)σ dXE2(XA2 +XN2)−XE2(dXA2 + dXN2)
(XA2 +XN2)2
+
dXE1(XA2 +XN2)−XE1(dXA2 + dXN2)
(XA2 +XN2)2
=
xsA1 + x
s
N1 − xE1
xsA2 + x
s
N2
σp̂x2 −
π2
px2
(
xsA1+x
s
N1
xsA2+x
s
N2
− xsA1+xsN1−xE1xsA2+xsN2−xE2
)
xsA2 + x
s
N2
deA2
+
XE1eF1 −XE2eF1 ·
xsA1+x
s
N1−xE1
xsA2+x
s
N2−xE2
xsA2 + x
s
N2
deF1 −
XE2eF2 ·
xsA1+x
s
N1
xsA2+x
s
N2
xsA2 + x
s
N2
deF2.
The relative commodity supply of A and N is equal to:
qs =
∑
xsj1∑
xsj2
=
XA1 +XN1
XA2 +XN2
, j = A,N. (A.25)
Total differentiation of (A.25) and afterwards inserting (A.1)-(A.7) yields:
dqs =
(XA1eA1 deA1 +X
N1
eN1
deN1)(X
A2 +XN2)− (XA1 +XN1)(XA2eA2 deA2 +XN2eN2 deN2)
(XA2 +XN2)2
(A.26)
=
π1
xsA2 + x
s
N2
deA1 −
π2
px2
· xsA1+xsN1xsA2+xsN2
xsA2 + x
s
N2
deA2
+
XE1eF1 + px2X
E2
eF1
xsA2 + x
s
N2
deF1 −
XE2eF2 ·
xsA1+x
s
N1
xsA2+x
s
N2
xsA2 + x
s
N2
deF2.
Equating (A.24) and (A.26) yields:
dpx2 =
px2
σ
(
π1
xsA1 + x
s
N1 − xE1
deA1 − π2
px2(xsA2 + x
s
N2 − xE2)
deA2 +ΘdeF1
)
, (A.27)
where Θ =
px2XE2eF1
xsA1+x
s
N1−xE1 +
px2XE2eF1
px2(xsA2+x
s
N2−xE2) .
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A.3 The Combined Market
A.3.1 The Quantities on the Combined Market
Inserting (A.27) in (A.19) for deA2 = 0 yields:
deF1 =
pe1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
Γ0
deA1 +
XE2eF1eN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
Γ0
(A.28)
· px2
σ
(
π1
xsA1 + x
s
N1 − xE1
deA1 +ΘdeF1
)
=
[pe1σ + px2X
E2
eF1
π1eN1ηN1
xsA1+x
s
N1−xE1 ][pe2 − px2X
E2
eF2eF2
eN2ηN2]
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
deA1.
Inserting (A.27) and (A.28) in (A.20) for deA2 = 0 yields:
deF2 =
pe1px2X
E2
eF2eF1
eN2ηN2
Γ0
deA1 +
XE2eF1eN1ηN1[px2X
E2
eF2eF1
eN2ηN2]
Γ0
(A.29)
· px2
σ
(
π1
xsA1 + x
s
N1 − xE1
deA1
+Θ
[pe1σ + px2X
E2
eF1
π1eN1ηN1
xsA1+x
s
N1−xE1 ][pe2 − px2X
E2
eF2eF2
eN2ηN2]
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
deA1
⎞⎠
=
[pe1σ + px2X
E2
eF1
π1eN1ηN1
xsA1+x
s
N1−xE1 ]px2X
E2
eF2eF1
eN2ηN2
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
deA1.
Adding (A.28) and (A.29) yields:
deF1 + deF2 = deFΣ =
[pe1σ + px2X
E2
eF1
π1eN1ηN1
xsA1+x
s
N1−xE1 ]Γ1
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
deA1. (A.30)
Inserting (A.28) and (A.30) in (29) yields:
dD(eF1, eFΣ)  0 (A.31)
⇔ [pe1σ + px2XE2eF1
π1eN1ηN1
xsA1 + x
s
N1 − xE1
][[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2] + λΓ1] deA1  0.
Inserting (A.27) in (A.19) for deA1 = 0 yields:
deF1 =
pe2px2X
E2
eF1eF2
eN1ηN1
Γ0
deA2 +
XE2eF1eN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
Γ0
(A.32)
· px2
σ
(
− π2
px2(xsA2 + x
s
N2 − xE2)
deA2 +ΘdeF1
)
=
pe2σpx2X
E2
eF1eF2
eN1ηN1
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
deA2
−
px2X
E2
eF1
π2eN1ηN1
px2(xsA2+x
s
N2−xE2) [pe2 − px2X
E2
eF2eF2
eN2ηN2]
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
deA2.
Inserting (A.27) and (A.32) in (A.20) for deA1 = 0 yields:
deF2 =
pe2[pe1 − [XE1eF1eF1 + px2XE2eF1eF1 ]eN1ηN1]
Γ0
deA2 (A.33)
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+
XE2eF1eN1ηN1[px2X
E2
eF2eF1
eN2ηN2]
Γ0
· px2
σ
(
− π2
px2(xsA2 + x
s
N2 − xE2)
deA2
+Θ
pe2σpx2X
E2
eF1eF2
eN1ηN1
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
deA2
−Θ
px2X
E2
eF1
π2eN1ηN1
px2(xsA2+x
s
N2−xE2) [pe2 − px2X
E2
eF2eF2
eN2ηN2]
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
deA2
⎞⎠
=
pe2σ[pe1 − [XE1eF1eF1 + px2XE2eF1eF1 ]eN1ηN1]
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
deA2
−
px2X
E2
eF1
π2eN1ηN1
px2(xsA2+x
s
N2−xE2)px2X
E2
eF2eF1
eN2ηN2 + pe2px2X
E2
eF1
ΘeN1ηN1
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
deA2.
Adding (A.32) and (A.33) yields:
deF1 + deF2 = deFΣ =
pe2σΓ2 − px2XE2eF1 π2eN1ηN1px2(xsA2+xsN2−xE2)Γ1 − pe2px2X
E2
eF1
ΘeN1ηN1
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
deA2.
(A.34)
Inserting (A.32) and (A.34) in (29) yields:
dD(eF1, eFΣ)  0 (A.35)
⇔ [pe2σ[px2XE2eF1eF2eN1ηN1 + λΓ2]− px2XE2eF1
π2eN1ηN1
px2(xsA2 + x
s
N2 − xE2)
· [[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2] + λΓ1]− λpe2px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1] deA2  0.
A.3.2 The Prices on the Combined Market
Inserting (A.28) in (A.27) for deA2 = 0 yields:
dpx2
deA1
=
px2
σ
(
π1
xsA1 + x
s
N1 − xE1
(A.36)
+Θ
[pe1σ + px2X
E2
eF1
π1eN1ηN1
xsA1+x
s
N1−xE1 ][pe2 − px2X
E2
eF2eF2
eN2ηN2]
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
⎞⎠
=
px2
π1
xsA1+x
s
N1−xE1Γ0 + pe1px2Θ[pe2 − px2X
E2
eF2eF2
eN2ηN2]
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
>0.
Inserting (A.32) in (A.27) for deA1 = 0 yields:
dpx2
deA2
=
px2
σ
(
− π2
px2(xsA2 + x
s
N2 − xE2)
(A.37)
+Θ
pe2σpx2X
E2
eF1eF2
eN1ηN1 − px2XE2eF1 π2eN1ηN1px2(xsA2+xsN2−xE2) [pe2 − px2X
E2
eF2eF2
eN2ηN2]
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
⎞⎠
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=−
px2
π2
px2(xsA2+x
s
N2−xE2)Γ0 − pe2px2Θpx2X
E2
eF1eF2
eN1ηN1
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
<0.
Inserting (A.36) in (A.17) for deA2 = 0 yields:
dpe1
deA1
=−
pe1
eN1ηN1
[Γ0 − pe1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]]
Γ0
+
pe1X
E2
eF1
[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
Γ0
(A.38)
·
px2
π1
xsA1+x
s
N1−xE1Γ0 + pe1px2Θ[pe2 − px2X
E2
eF2eF2
eN2ηN2]
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
=−
pe1
eN1ηN1
σ[Γ0 − pe1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]]
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
+
pe1px2X
E2
eF1
[ π1xsA1+x
s
N1−xE1 +Θ][pe2 − px2X
E2
eF2eF2
eN2ηN2]
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
>0.
Inserting (A.36) in (A.18) for deA2 = 0 yields:
dpe2
deA1
=
pe1pe2px2X
E2
eF2eF1
Γ0
+
XE2eF2Γ3
Γ0
(A.39)
·
px2
π1
xsA1+x
s
N1−xE1Γ0 + pe1px2Θ[pe2 − px2X
E2
eF2eF2
eN2ηN2]
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
=
pe1pe2σpx2X
E2
eF2eF1
+ px2X
E2
eF2
π1
xsA1+x
s
N1−xE1Γ3 + pe1px2X
E2
eF2
Θ[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
>0 ⇐ Γ3 > 0.
Inserting (A.37) in (A.17) for deA1 = 0 yields:
dpe1
deA2
=
pe1pe2px2X
E2
eF1eF2
Γ0
+
pe1X
E2
eF1
[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
Γ0
(A.40)
· −
px2
π2
px2(xsA2+x
s
N2−xE2)Γ0 − pe2px2Θpx2X
E2
eF1eF2
eN1ηN1
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
=
pe1pe2σpx2X
E2
eF1eF2
− pe1px2XE2eF1 π2px2(xsA2+xsN2−xE2) [pe2 − px2X
E2
eF2eF2
eN2ηN2]
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
=
pe1
eN1ηN1
· deF1
deA2
 0 ⇔ deF1
deA2
 0.
Inserting (A.37) in (A.18) for deA1 = 0 yields:
dpe2
deA2
=−
pe2
eN2ηN2
[Γ0 − pe2[pe1 − [XE1eF1eF1 + px2XE2eF1eF1 ]eN1ηN1]]
Γ0
+
XE2eF2Γ3
Γ0
(A.41)
· −
px2
π2
px2(xsA2+x
s
N2−xE2)Γ0 − pe2px2Θpx2X
E2
eF1eF2
eN1ηN1
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
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=−
pe2
eN2ηN2
σ[Γ0 − pe2[pe1 − [XE1eF1eF1 + px2XE2eF1eF1 ]eN1ηN1]]
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
−
px2X
E2
eF2
π2
px2(xsA2+x
s
N2−xE2)Γ3 − pe2px2Θpx2eN1ηN1[X
E2
eF2
XE2eF1eF2 −XE2eF1XE2eF2eF2 ]
σΓ0 − px2XE2eF1ΘeN1ηN1[pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2]
.
A.4 The Gammas
Γ0 =[pe1 − [XE1eF1eF1 + px2XE2eF1eF1 ]eN1ηN1][pe2 − px2XE2eF2eF2eN2ηN2] (A.42)
− px2XE2eF1eF2eN1ηN1 · px2XE2eF2eF1eN2ηN2
=
pe2eN2|ηN2| pe1eN1|ηN1|
eF1ηF1,2eF2ηF2,1
·
⎡⎣( eF1ηF1,2
eN2|ηN2| +
eF1ηF1,2
eF2ηF2,2
)
·
(
eF2ηF2,1
eN1|ηN1| +
eF2ηF2,1
eF1ηF1,1
)
− 1
⎤⎦ ,
Γ1 =pe2 + [px2X
E2
eF2eF1
− px2XE2eF2eF2 ]eN2ηN2 (A.43)
=
pe2eN2|ηN2|
eF1ηF1,2
·
(
eF1ηF1,2
eN2|ηN2| +
eF1ηF1,2
eF2ηF2,2
− 1
)
,
0 ⇔ eF1ηF1,2
eN2|ηN2| +
eF1ηF1,2
eF2ηF2,2
 1,
Γ2 =pe1 − [XE1eF1eF1 + px2XE2eF1eF1 − px2XE2eF1eF2 ]eN1ηN1 (A.44)
=
pe1eN1|ηN1|
eF2ηF2,1
·
(
eF2ηF2,1
eN1|ηN1| +
eF2ηF2,1
eF1ηF1,1
− 1
)
,
0 ⇔ eF2ηF2,1
eN1|ηN1| +
eF2ηF2,1
eF1ηF1,1
 1,
Γ3 =Γ0 +
px2X
E2
eF1
pe2
· px2XE2eF2eF1eN1ηN1 · pe2 (A.45)
=
pe2eN2|ηN2| pe1eN1|ηN1|
eF1ηF1,2eF2ηF2,1
·
⎡⎣( eF1ηF1,2
eN2|ηN2| +
eF1ηF1,2
eF2ηF2,2
)
·
(
eF2ηF2,1
eN1|ηN1| +
eF2ηF2,1
eF1ηF1,1
)
− 1
−px2X
E2
eF1
pe1
· eF2ηF2,1
eN2|ηN2|
]
,
>Γ3 = px2X
E2
eF1
[px2X
E2
eF2
+ px2X
E2
eF2eF1
eN1ηN1]
= px2X
E2
eF1
· px2XE2eF2eF1eN1|ηN1|
(
eF1
∣∣ηF1,2∣∣
eN1|ηN1| − 1
)
,
 0 ⇔ eF1ηF1,2
eN1|ηN1|  1,
where Γ3 is a lower limit for Γ3.
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